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MODALITIES OF THE SUBLIME 
MODAL CATEGORIES BETWEEN REASON,  
UNDERSTANDING, AND SENSIBILITY 





Kant distingue il sublime in «matematico» e «dinamico»: il primo è esperito grazie 
alla sproporzione quantitativa tra l’osservatore e l’osservato, il secondo grazie alle 
forze smisurate dispiegate dalla natura. Fra le kantiane categorie «dinamiche» 
rientrano però anche i concetti modali; ora, esiste di fatto un sublime che si lascia 
pensare per mezzo di essi. Se ne può fare esperienza per vie puramente 
intellettuali (senza pregiudizio per eventuali operazioni artistiche volte a trasporre 
questa esperienza sul piano sensibile), leggendo taluni testi della tradizione 
filosofica – il Parmenide di Platone, la Scienza della logica di Hegel, il Tractatus di 
Wittgenstein – in cui necessità e possibilità giocano un ruolo ambivalente: mettere 
in scacco l’intelletto da un lato, elevarlo a una comprensione superiore dall’altro – 
alla ragione. 
Kant distingue le sublime « mathématique » du sublime « dynamique » : on fait 
l’expérience du premier en vertu de a disproportion quantitative entre l’observateur 
et ce qui se passe devant (ou autour) de lui, alors que le deuxième se laisse 
expérimenter en présence de forces immenses déployées par la nature. Les 
concepts modaux, cependant, font eux aussi partie des catégories « dynamiques » 
kantiennes ; or, il existe en fait un sublime qui se laisse penser précisément par 
ceux-ci. On peut en faire l’expérience par des voies purement intellectuelles (sans 
préjudice pour des mises en œuvre artistiques visant à la transposer sur le plan de 
la sensibilité), notamment en lisant certains textes de la tradition philosophique – 
tels le Parménide de Platon, la Science de la logique de Hegel, le Tractatus de 
Wittgenstein – où nécessité et possibilité jouent un rôle ambivalent : mettre 
l’entendement en échec d’un côté, l`élever à une compréhension supérieure de 
l’autre – soit, à la raison. 
Kant distinguishes between the «mathematical» and the «dynamical» Sublime: the 
former is experienced by the disproportion in size between the viewer and what is 
given to her sight, the latter by unlimited forces deployed by nature. However, 
Kant’s «dynamical» categories include modal notions also; in facts, there exists a 
Sublime that is essentially marked by them, too. One can experience it by purely 
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intellectual means (without prejudice for any artistic attempt to transpose it into a 
visual or otherwise sensible field), namely by reading some philosophical texts – 
such as Plato’s Parmenides, Hegel’s Science of Logic, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – 
where possibility and necessity play an ambivalent role: to checkmate 
understanding on the one hand, and to raise it to a superior comprehension on the 
other, namely to reason 
 
Sublime is, according to Kant, what has the effect of 
intimidating the viewer inasmuch she is a sensible being, while at 
the same time elating her as an intelligible one. Kant divides the 
Sublime in Mathematical and Dynamical, according to the ‘means’ 
by which this effect is brought about: impressively big dimensions 
of what is offered to the sight or overwhelmingly huge forces at 
work, respectively. In the first case, the viewer directly feels her 
own smallness due to the fact that she cannot capture what she is 
confronted with in one comprehensive grasp of perception; in the 
second case, what is felt is rather one’s own extreme weakness by 
contrast with the indomitable force of nature. In both cases, 
however, the feeling of one’s own impotence and insignificance as 
a sensible being has the counter-effect of exalting one’s own 
awareness of being an intelligible being, along with the pride and 
the hopes that this carries with it. 
 
 
Dynamic Categories Claiming for Equality 
 
Thus, the Sublime deserves the label ‘mathematical’ when it 
is tied to dimensions, so to the categories of extensive quantity, 
‘dynamical’ when tied to force, so to one category of relation 
(namely, causality). But: why should the dynamic Sublime be 
limited to the categories of relation only? May the modal categories 
not claim for an equal status? 
If so, they must appeal to some experience that is both one 
of the Sublime and intimately marked by possibility and necessity – 
so intimately as to allow these categories to play a role in giving 
birth to the Sublime itself, and not merely – as Kant himself allows 
for – in accounting for judgments on its moral. So, let’s ask 
ourselves whether one can experience anything which prompts her 
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to call it sublime, while the experience itself is shaped by modal 
categories. 
Many of us did in fact experience a somehow sublime 
intimidation under the performance of necessity and possibility as 
they feature in some capital philosophical texts; first of all, in 
Plato’s Parmenides. The reader, when facing its second part, is 
likely to feel overwhelmed by the force of necessity. At each 
hypothesis, we are led to explore one more possibility of thought, a 
way of the understanding (namely, to understand the One); 
however, we are baffled each time by an aporetic conclusion. By 
the force of necessity, namely of cogent arguing, each possibility 
turns into (an aporetic) impossibility; which is itself necessity, given 
the well-known interdefinability between possibility and necessity 
via negation. Necessity, therefore, is not only what directs each of 
our steps along the way, but is also what the conclusion of the 
entire dialogue (and of each hypothesis in it) is like – namely, a 
cogent impossibility. 
Does this deserve the name of sublime? If so, it is for sure a 
piece of the wanted modal Sublime; I daresay it is in facts sublime, 
too. It is, however, a Sublime conveyed by an intellectual 
experience – one of performing a reasoning; better: of following 
one carrying us away – rather than by a sensible experience, as is 
the case with the Sublime Kant talks about. Is therefore the so 
conveyed Sublime itself intellectual? Does an intellectual Sublime 
as distinguished from the sensible one exist – or else do these 
predicates only pertain to the different ways to experience it? I tend 
to opt for the second answer, namely to talk of modal Sublime tout 
court and of an intellectual experience of it. However, if the modal 
Sublime turned out to be possibly known only by an intellectual 
experience, the above distinction would be likely to be idle. At any 
rate: if the modal Sublime we have so encountered is itself 
intellectual, it is also, and more profoundly, a piece of rational 
Sublime. The understanding (as a faculty of concepts and 
judgments) is the hero rather of the first part of the dialogue, where 
it is confronted with its own difficulties (cf. Parmenides’ objections 
to Socrates’ theory of ideas) in a quite straightforward way, 
namely, in its own way, properly. In the second part of the 
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dialogue, on the other hand, it is rather reason as a faculty of 
inferences aiming at a totality that plays the game. The totality 
aimed at is one of conditions and conclusions, up to a knowledge 
of nothing less than the One. Here conclusions are drawn from 
hypotheses which are, at the very least, incompatible with each 
other. The difficulty of composing them coherently, of thinking all of 
them in one, is the result of a coherent reasoning. Thereby, we 
experience both our possibility of cogently thinking and our cogent 
impossibility to conceive of the result. But we are nonetheless led 
to grasp that impossibility as our own, as a necessary result of our 
reasoning, of our capability to explore the possible (at each 
hypothesis); as a baffling one, and, though, attained by steps of 
ours, made while being aware of what we were doing. Thus, in one 
sense, we do understand our result. 
This does ease – without erasing – the frustration we are 
experiencing. It is not, however, as sensible beings that we feel 
oppressed, but rather in our very intellectual performances. It is the 
intellectual rather than the sensible limitation that is overcome: the 
reader both feels trapped in untenable conclusions and rises above 
her own incapability to grasp them in their necessity since the 
intimate possibilities of her thinking. Thus, understanding stares at 
reason. Understanding is exalted by being shown how its own 
coherence can lead it beyond itself, although not out of its own 
impasse. Far before paraconsistent logic attempted to educate us 
to tolerate some contradictions, Plato offers us an experience of 
paraconsistency. 
Whereas Socrates’ theory of ideas was hit by Parmenides’ 
objections, now the intellect dwells in its own impasse. Aporia is 
here ambivalent, just like Achilles’ spear, which could both wound 
and heal. Many philosophers – Plotinus, Nicholas of Cusa, most of 
all Hegel – will subsequently take the rise of understanding to a 
superior comprehension through its own aporias very seriously. 
They will manage to make its dwelling within them into a step 
further – which is not, however, an exit toward a noncontradictory 
stay, for contradiction somehow does remain: it now dwells within 
the result. Hegel will call this reason – which now turns out to be a 
faculty for totality (as in Kant) that is also one for containing 
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(without killing) contradictions. Aufhebung is Hegel’s specific 
manner to walk the pathway of aporia, to rise by means of the 
latter – with its necessity – to the dimension of intelligibility. Does 
each step of Aufhebung offer the opportunity to experience, in a 
further fashion, the modal Sublime? 
 
Back to Sensibility 
 
Up to this point, the modal Sublime has been spanning 
between reason and understanding. And sensibility? Does it have 
no access to the extreme tip of the dynamical Sublime, namely the 
modal one? This is questionable: after all, many artists do strive to 
show us some unforeseen possibilities for perception – which are 
possibilities for perception, i.e. in the sensible domain. Do they 
lead further – in some cases at least – to the intelligible? This, 
however, would only result in an experience of the modal Sublime 
if the disclosure of the new possibility went along with an 
impossibility – a quite distressing one. To this effect, I just recall 
the final scene of Peter Weir’s The Truman Show, when Truman 
touches with his hand... the (cardboard) horizon of his entire life. 
And opens it to step forth. 
 
But let’s step back to the door from where one can see new 
possibilities for perception while feeling constrained by an 
impossibility. Will one then look toward an intelligible realm, or 
better: through the intelligible dimension of the world? Now, 
intelligence itself has been construed in terms of an – unattainable, 
ever displacing – horizon strictly tied with the one of sensible 
experience (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty; cf. also Kant’s Was heißt: 
sich im Denken orientieren?). Here, however, the question is 
whether the relation between sensibility and intelligence as 
dimensions of experience provides an access to the intelligible 
dimension of the world. If so, this would qualify as a sensible 
experience of the modal Sublime, provided it would take place by 
means of, or at least go along with, the experience of an 
impossibility of ours. 
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Here further investigation and excursion within the arts is 
needed. I only sketch some clues: it is question of an open path 
but somehow impossible to walk along – and though, it is open to 
me. It is some impossibility of my perception that I grasp, an 
impossibility pertaining to me as a sensible being; thereby, I 
become aware of it as an impossibility of mine, as the open door I 
am staying in and looking from. Toward an intelligible dimension of 
the world? I leave this issue open. However, thanks to the artist 
who showed me the (obstructed) way, the door to it is now open, to 
me. 
Perhaps more; is it, just like the Door of the Law, open for 
me? 
 
So, is there hope, much hope – for God, but not for us? If art 
is sublime, it is because it opens the door. In order to stay in it, 
then, there is no need for any guardian. 
 
 
Appendix. Qualifying a Quantum of Sublime 
A Midsummer Daydream 
 
 
And at the instant he knew, he ceased to know 
(Jack London) 
 
When quantity is in play, it is typically, extensive quantity; 
however, there is still room for a Sublime tied to the effects of a 
seemingly infinite intensity. Recall that Duns Scot, in order to 
convey the idea of the Summum Ens, had recourse to the highest 
degree of a quality (namely, whiteness), i.e. to an infinite intensive 
quantity; could not the latter be sublime? Its power is likely to be so 
annihilating for our senses as to suggest a step beyond the very 
domain of sensibility; if the limit of a sensible intensity cannot be 
born by the sight, if the highest degree of, say, whiteness is 
blinding, it seems thereby to hint at the equally and even more 
unbearable highest degree of being – the one whereby even 
Moses could not look into... God’s face. (According to Rilke, angels 
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themselves ought to be careful: «Gott sah mich an; er 
blendete...»). 
Not to mention a whiteness that goes in the very opposite 
direction: think of Moby Dick... 
 
Appendix II. How to Make Intelligible a Sensible World 
Prolegomena to Any Future Pictures at a Tractarian Exhibition 
 
 
If the limit of a sensible intensity cannot be born by the sight, 
what exactly does it hints thereby at? Either at a realm beyond the 
sensible one – in a Kantian way; or else at the very limit of this 
realm, if we think the world as one, nothing lying beyond it, 
properly. This may pave the way to a rather Wittgensteinian 
approach to the Sublime. Here what is intelligible is not a second 
world, but rather the only world inasmuch as is comprehended as 
one, from within it, by virtue of its very showing itself – as one, and 
as existing. Which is what the first and the second hypothesis of 
Parmenides undertake to say. 
The intelligibility of the world, then, consists in its showing 
itself; and symbols do also participate of just this kind of 
intelligibility, by playing a role in the self-showing of the world. 
Facts in the world consist of (sensible?) objects and can be said by 
means signs that are themselves complexes of such objects, while 
their form on the one hand, and on the other hand the unity and 
existence of the world can only show themselves; but sensible 
signs only become symbols (themselves facts) because they are 
related to the world, because they say and show something about 
it, thereby housing the self-monstration of the world itself. 
Each sensible sign becomes a symbol by showing the way 
(it says that) things are, i.e. how the world is; that the world is, as 
one and once for all, shows itself throughout each sign becoming a 
symbol, by accompanying their showing how things are. To have a 
meaning (vs. merely existing as a sensible piece of ink on paper, 
or wave in the air) is just to say and show something of the world. 
By showing the form they share with the facts, they cooperate to 
the self-showing of the world, thereby acquiring, in turn, an 
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intelligible status. Here ‘intelligible’ means, without equivocality, 
both ‘meaningful’ and ‘intrinsically related to the intellect’, i.e. given 
essentially in intellectual terms – although of course symbols are 
always instantiated by sensible signs; as the world is itself one, 
intelligible and made out of sensible objects at the same time. 
Kant also talks often in terms of a one-world conception of 
being (in the Critique of Judgment, in particular, see his frequent 
talk of a «noumenal substrate» of phenomena) such that the 
intelligible domain is conceived rather as an order of the world (the 
one allowing for a Kingdom of Ends) rather than as a second 
world. However, in Kant the relationship between this noumenal 
substrate and (its) phenomena remains unclear. In Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, on the other hand, this is exactly what is highlighted: the 
world is intelligible inasmuch as it shows itself while consisting of 
sensible (so Hintikka) objects to be said (named); symbols are 
intelligible facts saying (stating) facts by showing their own form 
and by means of objects (signs) which they do not name nor 
mention anyway, but rather put in use. 
So, provided the mystical is omnipresent, namely 
ceaselessly, if tacitly, present at any token of speech; could it be 
experienced as sublime? Could the experience of it turn into one 
whereby it unfolds as, specifically, sublime? As a reader of the 
Tractatus, I dare answer simply yes. Sublime is, in fact, what a 
reader of the very words of Wittgenstein’s experiences, what the 
mystical experienced by reading the Tractatus is like. With its final 
gesture of throwing back the ladder used to climb up, it makes 
intelligence culminate along with the impotence of ordinary, 
intellectual symbols implemented in sensible signs to say. Thus, 
the Sublime can be experienced just by reading Wittgenstein’s 
lines, quite apart from any – if any – further mise en scène in a 
sensible domain. In facts, I do not know whether any artist has yet 
elicited some sort of intimidating and elating experience from the 
Tractatus as a ground-text but by means of a sensible material 
(say, in an exhibition) other than words printed in a book. 
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P. S. In order to convey a vague idea of what a transposition of the modal Sublime 
into a perceptual (say, visual) domain might be like, a poem by Octavio Paz may be 




Los insectos atareados, 
los caballos color de sol, 
los burros color de nube, 
las nubes, rocas enormes que no pesan, 
los montes como cielos desplomados, 
la manada de árboles bebiendo en el arroyo, 
todos están ahí, dichosos en su estar, 
frente a nosotros que no estamos, 
comidos por la rabia, por el odio, 






Clouds, huge weightless rocks, 
Mountains like heavens tumbled down, 
A herd of trees drinking in the brook, 
They all stay there, happy in their staying, 
Before us who do not, 
Eaten by anger, by hate, 




Thanks to Robert R. Clewis (Gwynedd-Mercy College, Pennsylvania) for both his 
remarks and the reference to Moby Dick's whiteness; for the linguistic revision, both 
to him and to Julia, from Hamburg in Berlin (plus Mariana, natively speaking 
Spanish and English from Argentina onward). One last little help is owed to 
Theodora l’Anglo-Saxonne in Geneva. 
